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Abstract 
Enabling Patient-Centred (PC) care in modern healthcare 
requires the flow of medical information with the patient be-
tween different healthcare providers as they follow the pa-
tient’s treatment plan. However, PC care threatens the stabil-
ity of the balance of information security in the support sys-
tems since legacy systems fall short of attaining a security 
balance when sharing their information due to compromises 
made between its availability, integrity, and confidentiality. 
Results show that the main reason for this is that information 
security implementation in discrete legacy systems focused
mainly on information confidentiality and integrity leaving 
availability a challenge in collaboration. Through an empiri-
cal study using domain analysis, observations, and interviews, 
this paper identifies a need for six information security re-
quirements in legacy systems to cope with this situation in 
order to attain the security balance in systems supporting PC 
care implementation in modern healthcare.
Keywords:
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Introduction
Information security implementation in information systems 
requires the three information security goals to be addressed:
availability, integrity, and confidentiality must be in the right 
balance for an application [1]. Information should be available 
only to those authorised to see it at appropriate times, can only 
be changed by those authorised to modify it, and kept from 
unauthorised disclosure [1, 2]. Since information security can-
not be absolute [3], the act of balancing these three goals is a 
key challenge in building secure systems especially as they 
often conflict [1, 29] (e.g., preserving confidentiality through 
access prevention compromises availability, this can result in 
an insecure system [1]). Therefore, establishing a balance that 
satisfies the user and the security professional is a trade-off 
between these three goals [3]. In traditional discrete systems, 
attaining this balance is achieved by creating a policy (consist-
ing of a set of information security rules implemented using 
security controls) to be enforced within the boundaries of the 
organisational domain, which gives it a single control point 
with a well-understood enforcement model [4]. These security 
rules define a user’s access rights to information resources 
which provides a balanced information security system meet-
ing the business needs [5]. However, attaining the balance of 
information security in collaborative environments (where 
distributed information resources are shared among geograph-
ically and administratively distributed physical organisations
[4, 6-9]) is difficult because there are multiple policy-
enforcement points in different organisations with inconsistent 
security rules [7], which makes compliance with such policies 
complicated [4]. This form of collaboration is needed in mod-
ern healthcare, particularly to support Patient-Centred (PC) 
care. Therefore, integration of the multiple points of control in 
harmony is an important information security issue in modern 
healthcare collaborative environments. This paper discusses 
security in current legacy systems, and the issues faced in
adopting PC care. It also identifies the information security 
requirements needed to maintain the stability of the infor-
mation security balance at the PC healthcare level.
Patient-centred care adoption in modern healthcare
Modern integrated healthcare services are an essential part of 
e-health [10]. They use ICT to enhance collaboration, commu-
nication, and coordination in the health sector [8, 10]. Care
integration essential to PC care [11], is defined in [12] as:
‘A collaborative effort… where patients and the health 
care professionals collaborate as a team, share 
knowledge and work toward the common goals of opti-
mum healing and recovery.’
In the global adoption of PC care [13-15], patient treatment is 
shifting from a traditional [16] fragmented disease-centred 
approach towards an integrated PC one [11, 14-15, 17]. PC 
care has a more holistic view as it considers the patient’s con-
dition as a whole [17-18], where the patient is at the heart of 
these healthcare services and care is integrated and tailored 
around the patient’s needs and current state [11, 14, 19-20]. It 
encourages healthcare professionals to adapt to these needs 
[20] by collaborating as a Care Team (CT) [17] and using
shared decision-making processes in regular Multi-
Disciplinary Team (MDT) reviews [15]. Also each CT mem-
ber collects relevant information and shares it with other 
members to collectively form a complete patient record about 
the patient’s holistic condition. These treatment delivery ap-
proaches have different attributes, the key emphasis in tradi-
tional disease-centered care is on record keeping [19] while 
the PC approach creates a “culture of open information” [20]
emphasising accessibility to patient information [19], team-
work and collaboration [17], and shared decision-making [15, 
20]. PC treatment is “shared care” of a patient [16].
Methods
Domain analysis [21]- was conducted to understand the com-
plexity of PC healthcare and develop a conceptual model. It is 
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best investigated through a real-life treatment pathway. To
study the various complexities due to different treatment path-
ways (called integrated care pathways), breast, Upper Gastro-
intestinal (UGI), and Hepatocellular (HC) cancer treatment 
pathways were analyzed (as published in the Map of Medicine 
clinical guidelines [22]). PC care was studied along each of 
these treatment pathways and a conceptual model developed 
for each pathway to show different aspects of PC care. Some 
results from the domain analysis and part of the breast cancer 
conceptual model are discussed in [23].
Observation of current practice- The use of Canisc {Cancer 
Network Information System Cymru (the support system 
providing information to health professionals treating Welsh 
cancer patients) [24]}, Centricity {the radiology system at 
Velindre National Health Service (NHS) Trust}, and the 
Welsh clinical portal [25] was studied. The role of MDT is an 
essential step towards PC care [26]. It is fundamental in most 
treatment pathways and is a major information sharing point 
for care management plans. A total of six different MDT re-
view sessions in the selected cancers pathways were observed.
Semi-structured interviews- were conducted with 10 inter-
viewees chosen because of their knowledge of the treatment 
pathways used in cancer care [26]. The interviews covered 
how PC care was being supported from the interviewees’ per-
spective by the current procedures linking the legacy systems 
and what would improve this support.
Results
The development of conceptual models helped gain an under-
standing of how treatment should be achieved in a PC manner.
This assisted in identification of weaknesses in legacy systems, 
when used in implementing PC care. These issues were inves-
tigated in finer detail in the interviews, which led to the identi-
fied requirements. The issues were synthesised from the inter-
view transcriptions [26] are presented here:
Issues in legacy healthcare systems in care management 
In Wales a typical scenario is a patient visits a GP, say in
Swansea, with alarming symptoms, and gets referred urgently 
to a gastroenterologist for oesophageal cancer diagnosis. Di-
agnostic tests are discussed and recorded at a local MDT re-
view. If the patient is found fit for further potentially curative 
treatment s/he may be referred to Cardiff cancer service for 
further staging tests prior to a fuller MDT review to discuss a 
final management plan. The patient will receive oncology
treatment at Velindre NHS Trust, while surgery treatment will 
be in Cardiff and Vale University Local Health Board. Both 
treatments are discussed at further MDT reviews. If s/he re-
lapses then palliative care may occur locally in another NHS 
Trust [26]. This treatment scenario shows the distribution of 
care between Cardiff and Swansea with up to seven healthcare 
providers involved. Thus, the balance of information security 
must ensure that at the point of care, all CT members treating 
the patient are given speedy access to all the information need-
ed for the patient’s care regardless of the location, while limit-
ing access to the absolute minimum for people not treating the 
patient, without affecting its integrity [26]. However, legacy 
support systems used in current patient case management usu-
ally fall short of attaining and retaining the stability of balance 
of information security for the following reasons:
Information integrity- is sometimes hard to preserve once a 
human error has occurred in recording information following a 
referred patient between different healthcare providers. If an 
oncologist at one organisation receives an incorrect code for 
the diagnosed cancer type (i.e., a code referring to a different 
cancer type) current systems do not allow this consultant to 
change it [26]. This is because the information owner who 
recorded it works for a different healthcare provider, and edit 
access is not granted to external users [26]. A major weakness 
in the current system is that it cannot track back to the owner 
and the point where the information was compiled. Even if it 
can, there is a need to contact the originator (if known) to re-
quest an alteration which can only be done locally in the cur-
rent system [26].
Information availability- is extremely critical in patient care 
management, since more harm is done to the patient through 
lack of access to relevant information, as it prevents informed 
clinical decisions using it, than by misuse due to the risk of 
information falling into the wrong hands [26]. However, PC 
care compromises the availability of patient information for a
number of reasons. Firstly, many legacy systems in the UK 
were designed in 1948 when the NHS was established [14] to 
meet the requirements of a disease-centric approach. All these 
systems adopted the NHS national high-level policies and 
practice guidelines, and each system adapted the policies and 
guidelines to meet local needs [27]. This was achieved by in-
terpreting high-level policies into lower-level ones, resulting in 
different inconsistent information security policies and rules. 
Once information is shared, different healthcare providers can 
have varied interpretations of the guidance about information 
security rules protecting information [26]. These different in-
terpretations may block CT members from accessing required
information at the point of care [26], and current systems can-
not override access permissions locally to allow access in such 
cases, so CT members must contact the originator to ask for
relaxation of security rules [26]. This affects the treatment 
continuity, causes delays, and limits the collaboration’s effec-
tiveness. Secondly, the big challenge in information security 
solutions in healthcare systems is that life threatening emer-
gency situations require resilience, most importantly when the 
patient is unconscious and decisions mean life or death [26]. In
such cases, there is a need to access any information stored 
about the patient at very short notice. This may require trusted 
CT members to access information not normally required for 
their role [26] and, this means a need to enable immediate ac-
cess by forcing the system to yield to CT access needs and 
relax already assigned access rights when every second counts, 
then restore these levels of information security after the 
emergency event to give systems the resilience needed in such 
cases. This introduces the need for a “circle of trust” imple-
mentation (explained later). A major weakness in current lega-
cy systems is the lack of a way to deal with such cases [26],
when writing to the original organisation requesting access, 
may delay or prevent the treatment happening in a timely fash-
ion [26].
Moreover, to help track patient treatment as a single business 
process, systems supporting healthcare should reflect the care 
management occurring in a number of healthcare organisa-
tions, and the flow of their information following the treatment 
pathway [26]. Currently, enhanced legacy systems supporting 
PC healthcare are designed to organize patient case-note data 
in parallel on a healthcare-provider basis and not in sequence 
on a treatment-point basis [26]. Thus information management 
is based on the healthcare provider and each patient’s case-
notes are split into parallel partitions where each provider 
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holds relevant information for a disease or part of the treat-
ment in their partition [26]. Each provider owns and controls 
their part of the information, and they give direct access to it 
by listing CT member’s names as having access [26]. If a CT 
member happens not to be listed for access to the information
(normally caused by the interpretation of security rules), he 
will have no access until the other provider grants it [26]. This 
structure sometimes makes it difficult to find relevant clinical 
information and causes information duplication in the parti-
tions [26]. This can cause inconsistency issues directly affect-
ing the patient’s clinical care. Also, problems can lead to los-
ing track of patients and their information at some point in the 
treatment pathway. For example, it may be unclear which CT 
member is responsible for the patient’s follow-up after treat-
ment leading to the patient not receiving a necessary service
[23, 27]; or care management may be interrupted when infor-
mation does not flow with the patient from one provider to 
another on the clinical pathway (e.g., when patients are re-
ferred to Cardiff from Swansea but scan images do not follow, 
this can make critical information unavailable at a treatment 
point and cause incorrect treatment) [26].
Information confidentiality- is essential due to movement 
towards a culture of open information, in which information 
access is a priority to healthcare professionals [15, 20]. A
higher degree of information sharing is needed in PC care than 
in a traditional approach [8, 15]. Confidentiality can be 
breached in PC care if information is improperly disclosed to 
unauthorized people. Two factors increase the risk of improper 
disclosure of information: the number of people having legiti-
mate access to the information, and the value of this infor-
mation [28]. The higher risk of disclosure to unauthorized 
people is due to the NHS planning to integrate all relevant 
systems of 100 Health Authorities, around 3,500 GPs and over 
400 NHS Trusts, in the modernisation of UK healthcare sys-
tems [14]. Also, there is a direct correlation between valuable 
information and the risk of its disclosure [28]. There are many 
reasons why systems supporting healthcare store highly valua-
ble information. First and foremost, clinical information has 
value as a basis for healthcare professionals’ decision-making 
processes, and its corruption can lead to incorrect decisions, 
which may harm or even kill a patient [28]. The systems hold 
extensive patient information, which may contain personal, 
embarrassing, and critical medical information [23]. This in-
formation has a longevity characteristic [29], meaning it is 
highly sensitive [16] and confidential [26, 30] at all times. 
Therefore, its nature means medical information should only 
be disclosed for permitted medical purposes [30]. This puts 
PC information at great risk of improper disclosure [28] and 
stresses the need to protect information from those not needing 
it, while ensuring availability of life-critical patient infor-
mation on a need-to-know basis at the time of care 
[30].Finally, according to Pfleeger [1] “centralized control of 
access is fundamental to preserving confidentiality and integri-
ty, but it is not clear that a single access control point can en-
force availability.” This is clear from the discussion above
where most of the information issues are about availability. 
This is expected as much of the research reported in the litera-
ture has focused on confidentiality and integrity, and full im-
plementation of availability is security’s next great challenges
[1]. This means that information security implementation in 
legacy discrete systems supporting the traditional treatment 
approach mainly focused on the confidentiality and integrity of 
medical information as they were an issue while availability 
was not. Thus, the key reason why they fall short of attaining a 
security balance in PC care is that information availability only 
became an issue with collaboration.
Information security requirements
For legacy systems to address these issues in PC care, they 
need to deal with six key information security requirements:
Role-base access control- Access to medical information must 
be on a need-to-know basis [30]. Thus before sharing medical 
information, information owners must guarantee granular ac-
cess to the information based on a healthcare professional’s 
role in the patient’s treatment. 
Fine-grained access control- Different roles have different
information-access needs, and privacy violations can be ex-
pected if all members in the healthcare environment can see 
every patient’s records [28]. Also although clinical infor-
mation is confidential [26, 30], it has different levels of sensi-
tivity [26]. Examples include systems recording details about 
social services, HIV positive results, and paediatrics systems 
recording child abuse information [26]. This information can 
be labelled as being more sensitive. Thus it is key to have fine-
grained access control that enforces security rules within a 
resource at different granularity levels [9] by moving infor-
mation security controls from a coarse-grained to a finer-
grained level [9]. This will give legacy systems the flexibility 
to provide different protection levels for different parts of the 
information resource based on sensitivity level, and thus, ena-
ble resilience. When an information resource is shared in its 
entirety, different parts of the information will be accessed by 
authorised people based on their sensitivity level [9]. This will 
need an information classification scheme based on granularity 
classified according to its sensitivity levels. Granular access to 
certain parts of the information should correspond to a 
healthcare professional’s roles in the patient’s treatment. Thus, 
access privileges are assigned to a role instead of a user, and 
users are assigned to roles.
Circle of trust- as well as the above access controls, which 
balance the fine line between availability and confidentiality of 
information, there is a need for a mechanism to differentiate 
between authorised users who need immediate access to in-
formation in emergency (the CT members trusted to break the 
glass) and other authorised roles that do not [16] by using the 
circle of trust. This circle stretches across the security domains 
of all collaborating health providers to include all CT mem-
bers treating the patient no matter where they work.
Persistent control- the longevity characteristic of medical in-
formation means its value may never decay, and thus even 
archived records relating to deceased patients may remain con-
fidential. It is therefore critical in PC care to have constant 
protection with information security controls that move with 
the information. This assures that information will only be 
disclosed to people using it for permitted medical purposes 
regardless of its location in the treatment pathway [30]. Ena-
bling such persistent control requires an ability to track the 
flow of information among its authorised users as it crosses the 
boundary of the organisational protection system. This should 
be sequentially organised to facilitate its tracking.
Dynamic control- is also needed to provide information own-
ers with full control over their information by being able to 
change the level of protection and even update the information 
remotely at any time after the information is shared and stored 
in systems outside their organisational boundary. Changing 
protection level is key when legacy systems do not follow 
guidelines and blocks legitimate users, while being able to 
alter information will assist in retaining its integrity in case of 
a disastrous error.
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Human-level policy awareness- a well-designed system must 
take people into account [31] because as Pipkin [2] states
“most of an organisation’s intellectual property is contained in 
the minds of the organisation’s employees.” Based on a firm 
belief that the protection of patient information is a coopera-
tive responsibility of all the healthcare professionals involved,
and because shared care cannot be achieved without healthcare 
professionals thinking patient-centrically, this paper suggests 
raising awareness around PC care and information security 
needs to be addressed at two different levels: at the collabora-
tion level by running information security awareness training 
for staff of all providers; at the human level, the system pro-
vides simple and readable policies which are attached to pro-
tected information to inform a user of its protection level clas-
sified by the owner.
Realizing requirements in patient-centric implementation
In this section, the implementation of the requirements to ad-
dress the categorised information security issues is discussed.
Information integrity issue- can be addressed in two ways. 
First, by tracking the information flow against the treatment 
points; this helps identify a CT member who recorded infor-
mation incorrectly and the owner. Second, the system should 
enable the owners to correct such information remotely from a 
system in another organisation. This requires the provision of 
persistent and dynamic control over information. 
Information availability issues- can be addressed by using 
persistent and dynamic controls. Thus, when CT members are 
blocked from accessing information, the system allows infor-
mation owners to relax security rules remotely and when 
members of the circle of trust need speedy access to override 
any rules blocking it. This needs extra support in current sys-
tems to easily track and give access to information based on 
the sequence of treatment points and time. This will make it 
easier for CT members to find relevant information about the 
patient and not lose track of the patient and their information. 
Also varied interpretations of policies can be avoided by rais-
ing human awareness at the PC care level. This requires edu-
cating healthcare professionals about PC care and attaining a 
security balance in shared care. This training is essential in
understanding the policies of other providers showing how 
hosting system should protect their information. Also, com-
municating these policies with the information in a readable 
manner ensures a high level of awareness among all CT mem-
bers. The other availability issue is addressed by having a 
‘breaking-glass’ feature in emergency cases. This preserves
patient privacy when confidentiality is needed, while providing
the required resilience to deal with emergency cases. The con-
cept of a glass box is to store information with a high level of 
sensitivity, means it is kept behind the glass and protected us-
ing tighter security rules and controls. Thus it is more secure 
and protected, while the resource is available for sharing with 
those in critical need of it. The usage of this feature is ex-
pected among CT members, and therefore they are added to 
the circle of trust for distinction with a supporting alarm sys-
tem in place to report any breach of trust happening when 
someone outside the circle of trust tries to break into this sen-
sitive information. This feature is achieved at two levels; be-
fore and after an incident. First, the system should support 
fine-grained access control, with information classified accord-
ing to its sensitivity level. Then each category is assigned a set 
of security rules and controls reflecting the required protection 
level to give the system the flexibility needed while protecting 
patient privacy. After a glass is broken, the system should re-
cover by restoring the required levels of security balance, and 
requesting a justification. Access monitoring and audit analy-
sis is needed at all times to identify the user accessing the in-
formation and to react in a case of privacy invasion. Studying 
these incidents assists in learning more about how to adapt 
systems to meet future needs.
Information confidentiality issue- cannot be solved without 
consideration of availability issues discussed above as these 
requirements are in direct conflict [1, 29], which makes it hard 
to achieve a balance with current computer security mecha-
nisms [32]. Therefore, to attain the balance between availabil-
ity and confidentiality, the circle of trust is used to distinguish
CT members from other authorised users. After properly au-
thenticating a user, the system should be able to make deci-
sions that control information access based on the user’s role 
and being in the circle of trust. This relaxes security rules ap-
plying to users in the circle if immediate access is needed, but 
not for those outside the circle. Fine-grained control is im-
portant as it maintains the confidentiality level while giving 
flexibility to tighten the security rules based on the infor-
mation’s sensitivity level.
Discussion and conclusion
PC healthcare is significantly enhancing the quality of care, 
but it reveals weaknesses in current legacy healthcare support 
systems. There is a need to facilitate provision of adequate 
means for communicating information at all stages of a pa-
tient’s treatment pathway, regardless of location of a treatment 
point. This is achievable by rebalancing the levels of infor-
mation availability, integrity and confidentiality with the resil-
ience which healthcare environments require. However, legacy 
systems cannot support the balance of information security 
when information flows between different healthcare providers
as their information security implementation is focused on 
information confidentiality and integrity. Using a mixture of 
qualitative research methods has led to the identification of six 
key information security requirements to enable legacy sys-
tems to achieve this balance and, thus, facilitate the implemen-
tation of PC care. Results show a need for: access that is fine-
grained and based on a healthcare professional’s role; employ-
ing the circle of trust concept; persistent and dynamic control 
over this access across inter-connected systems’ boundaries; 
and raising the information security awareness of collaborating 
users. However, implementation is affected by a number of 
factors. First, older legacy systems do not have the required 
facilities, while newer systems may provide some of the re-
quirements. Second, variation in security levels of the collabo-
rating systems means aggregating information from a 
healthcare provider employing a higher level of security with 
tighter security controls than the hosting system can be a prob-
lem and vice versa. Thus, implementation requires the selec-
tion of different information security mechanisms, and the 
success of the implementation will depend on this selection. 
The selection itself will be based on the functionality of the 
existing system, and the protection level required. The chal-
lenge lies in ensuring that the protection level is not reduced 
when information with high-level protection is moved to a 
system with lesser protection, and this can be resolved by 
breaking down the protection using its granularity. Finally, 
improving the effectiveness, dynamism, and potential of col-
laborative efforts in PC care requires extensive collaborative 
efforts and a major shift in organisational and cultural thinking 
to make it more integrated. This is almost as important as 
shifts in practice due to PC working.
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